Evidence · historical analysis
Did higher first-choice offer rates coincide with more “no offer” applicants?
No matching pair in this period: 0 primary and 0 secondary comparisons had both a higher first-preference rate and more “no offer” applicants.
England national · 2015/16–2025/26 · primary and secondary separately · applicant children on national offer day.
“No offer” is an offer-day status, not no eventual school place. A zero result here does not establish impossibility or describe local authorities.
What the comparison shows
Each phase has 11 annual observations and 10 adjacent-year comparisons. Primary and secondary are not children followed through time.
The question compares a rate with a count. Rates use applicant children as the denominator; offers to non-applicants are a separate source category.
There are no matching cases in either frozen national series. Contrary claims about local areas or future years cannot be inferred from that absence.
An ordinary secondary comparison
From 2024/25 to 2025/26, the first-preference rate rose while the no-offer count fell. These are separate national cohorts, not tracked children.
Scroll this table horizontally if needed. Values are fixed to this evidence edition.
| Phase | Academic year | Applicant children | First-preference offers | First-preference rate (%) | No-offer applicant count | No-offer rate (%) | Offers to non-applicants (separate) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Secondary | 80.960 | 609,576 | 505,477 | 82.923 | 1,357 | 0.223 | 1,382 |
| Secondary | 77.885 | 597,670 | 499,170 | 83.519 | 943 | 0.158 | 1,332 |
Complete national offer-day observations
Chronological within primary, then secondary. Exact rate definitions and other offer components are retained in the derived download.
Scroll this table horizontally if needed. Values are fixed to this evidence edition.
| Phase | Academic year | Applicant children | First-preference offers | First-preference rate (%) | No-offer applicant count | No-offer rate (%) | Offers to non-applicants (separate) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary | 125.938 | 636,279 | 558,366 | 87.755 | 2,838 | 0.446 | 631 |
| Primary | 118.588 | 641,572 | 566,836 | 88.351 | 2,374 | 0.370 | 613 |
| Primary | 112.056 | 620,330 | 558,411 | 90.018 | 1,051 | 0.169 | 815 |
| Primary | 106.211 | 608,180 | 553,309 | 90.978 | 843 | 0.139 | 591 |
| Primary | 100.950 | 608,957 | 551,826 | 90.618 | 787 | 0.129 | 571 |
| Primary | 96.190 | 612,146 | 552,286 | 90.221 | 774 | 0.126 | 554 |
| Primary | 91.864 | 580,771 | 533,014 | 91.777 | 751 | 0.129 | 456 |
| Primary | 87.913 | 576,147 | 531,179 | 92.195 | 652 | 0.113 | 620 |
| Primary | 84.292 | 568,560 | 525,917 | 92.500 | 484 | 0.085 | 618 |
| Primary | 80.960 | 555,643 | 517,620 | 93.157 | 376 | 0.068 | 600 |
| Primary | 77.885 | 550,270 | 509,344 | 92.563 | 329 | 0.060 | 475 |
| Secondary | 125.938 | 533,314 | 449,308 | 84.248 | 2,131 | 0.400 | 2,494 |
| Secondary | 118.588 | 548,006 | 460,836 | 84.093 | 2,288 | 0.418 | 2,044 |
| Secondary | 112.056 | 562,487 | 469,587 | 83.484 | 1,785 | 0.317 | 2,001 |
| Secondary | 106.211 | 582,761 | 478,470 | 82.104 | 2,604 | 0.447 | 1,319 |
| Secondary | 100.950 | 604,496 | 488,931 | 80.882 | 3,308 | 0.547 | 1,580 |
| Secondary | 96.190 | 600,352 | 493,291 | 82.167 | 2,315 | 0.386 | 1,657 |
| Secondary | 91.864 | 605,206 | 490,965 | 81.124 | 2,254 | 0.372 | 1,738 |
| Secondary | 87.913 | 614,059 | 511,226 | 83.254 | 1,845 | 0.300 | 1,703 |
| Secondary | 84.292 | 619,991 | 511,958 | 82.575 | 1,466 | 0.236 | 1,295 |
| Secondary | 80.960 | 609,576 | 505,477 | 82.923 | 1,357 | 0.223 | 1,382 |
| Secondary | 77.885 | 597,670 | 499,170 | 83.519 | 943 | 0.158 | 1,332 |
Every adjacent-year comparison
Positive rate change alone is not a matching case: the no-offer applicant count must also increase. No pair satisfies both conditions.
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| Phase | Earlier academic start year | Following academic start year | First-preference rate change (percentage points) | No-offer count change | Rate increased? | No-offer count increased? | Both increased? | Printed-rate rounding changes condition? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary | 2015 | 2016 | 0.596 | -464 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2016 | 2017 | 1.667 | -1,323 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2017 | 2018 | 0.959 | -208 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2018 | 2019 | -0.360 | -56 | No | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2019 | 2020 | -0.397 | -13 | No | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2020 | 2021 | 1.556 | -23 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2021 | 2022 | 0.418 | -99 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2022 | 2023 | 0.305 | -168 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2023 | 2024 | 0.657 | -108 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Primary | 2024 | 2025 | -0.594 | -47 | No | No | No | No |
| Secondary | 2015 | 2016 | -0.155 | 157 | No | Yes | No | No |
| Secondary | 2016 | 2017 | -0.609 | -503 | No | No | No | No |
| Secondary | 2017 | 2018 | -1.380 | 819 | No | Yes | No | No |
| Secondary | 2018 | 2019 | -1.222 | 704 | No | Yes | No | No |
| Secondary | 2019 | 2020 | 1.285 | -993 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Secondary | 2020 | 2021 | -1.043 | -61 | No | No | No | No |
| Secondary | 2021 | 2022 | 2.130 | -409 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Secondary | 2022 | 2023 | -0.678 | -379 | No | No | No | No |
| Secondary | 2023 | 2024 | 0.348 | -109 | Yes | No | No | No |
| Secondary | 2024 | 2025 | 0.597 | -414 | Yes | No | No | No |
Excluded source rows
The earlier research did not reconcile 2014. It remains excluded, not repaired or silently used.
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| Phase | Academic start year | Exclusion reason |
|---|---|---|
| Primary | 2014 | outside unsuppressed 2015 onwards analysis period |
| Secondary | 2014 | outside unsuppressed 2015 onwards analysis period |
Exclusions and comparison boundaries
The original 2014-inclusive check failed component reconciliation. Its failure is preserved; no repaired 2014 values or 2014 transition appear here.
The source identifies the pre-2015 suppression regime and unsuppressed 2015-onwards records. That establishes the chosen scope, not an explanation for each earlier numerical discrepancy.
Applicant outcomes are attributed to home/resident authority. This page uses the national records only, not local-authority comparisons or non-applicant rate denominators.
How to read the evidence
“No offer” can include an authority providing a list of available schools rather than a specified school place. The data stop at national offer day, before later rounds, waiting lists, appeals and eventual placements.
An increasing first-preference rate and an increasing no-offer count are not mathematically incompatible. They simply do not coincide in these included national comparisons.
Percentage-point changes compare rates; count changes compare applicant children. They are not the same unit and must not be added together.
Method
- Use the frozen release’s unsuppressed national series from 2015 onwards; preserve the earlier failed reconciliation without correcting its counts.
- Keep primary and secondary separately, with all annual observations and immediately adjacent academic-year pairs.
- Reconcile applicant offer components using the source definitions. Non-applicant offers are not included in applicant rate denominators.
- Calculate first-preference rate from first-preference offers divided by applications. Compare exact rates and no-offer applicant counts with the preceding year.
- Mark a matching pair only if both quantities increase. Audit printed source-rate rounding separately; never substitute missing or suppressed values with zero.
Comparisons use exact source values before display rounding. Derived rational values are displayed to three decimal places, nearest with halves away from zero; displayed precision is not an uncertainty interval. “Yes” and “No” describe the stated condition only.
What this evidence cannot establish
- National offer-day snapshot, not eventual placement
- No offer can include an offered list of available schools rather than a specified place
- Applications attributed to home/resident authority; national population here
- Different annual cohorts; no same-child or causal interpretation
- Non-applicant offers excluded from applicant rate denominators
- 2014 suppression-regime data excluded; old count discrepancies not repaired
- No personal admission probability or legal compliance conclusion
This establishes neither mathematical nor future impossibility, nor absence at local-authority level. It does not describe eventual placement, same-child outcomes, personal admission chances, authority behaviour or policy causation.
Sources and responsibility
Primary source observations
Department for Education — Primary and secondary school applications and offers 2025
- DfE applications and offers: frozen 2025/26 release
- DfE source methodology
- Open Government Licence v3.0
Source: Department for Education, Primary and secondary school applications and offers, 2025/26 release. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. CoryVu derived analysis; no endorsement implied.
Source units: applicant counts; derived percentage and percentage-point change.
CoryVu derived analysis
CoryVu constructed the bounded comparison and inspectable result. Separate automated reconstruction reproduced the evidence before this page was built. That is not independent expert certification or human computational review. The source publisher has not commissioned, endorsed or verified this analysis.
Download the derived evidence
CSV fields retain exact rational values where applicable. Read the dictionary and method alongside the data. These are derived artifacts, not the private source archive.
Frozen evidence edition
- Evidence edition
- schools-experimental-2-20260924
- Source edition
- 2025/26 release; unsuppressed 2015/16-2025/26 series
- Method version
- schools-experimental-2
- Automated pre-build verification
- 2026-09-24T13:32:59.970499+00:00
- Geographic scope
- England national
This frozen edition is reviewed for source corrections and maintained by CoryVu. A changed source or result requires a new verified edition; no silent append or “updated today” claim.
This experimental resource may attract little demand. It tests whether the complete paired evidence and explicit denominators are useful beyond the official tables; the zero result is not made more dramatic.
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